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We analyze contributions of di￿erent markets to price discovery on traded
in￿ation expectations and how it changed during the ￿nancial crisis. The
quicker information is processed on one market and the less one market is
disrupted by the ￿nancial crisis the more valuable is its information for cen-
tral banks and market participants. We use a new high frequency data set
on in￿ation-indexed and nominal government bonds as well as in￿ation swaps
to calculate information shares of break-even in￿ation rates in the euro area
and the US. For maturities up to 5 years new information comes from both
the swap and the bond markets. For longer maturities the swap market pro-
vides less and less information in the euro area. In the US where the market
volume of in￿ation-linked bonds is large the bond market dominates the price
discovery process for all maturities. The severe ￿nancial crisis that spread out
in Autumn 2008 drove a wedge between bond and swap break-even in￿ation
rates in both currencies. Price discovery ceased to take place on the swap mar-
ket. Disruptions coming from the short-end of the market even separated price
formation on both segments for maturities of up to 6 years in the US. Against
the backdrop of the most severe ￿nancial crisis in decades contributions to
price formation concentrated a lot more on the presumably safest ￿nancial
instrument: government bonds.
Keywords: in￿ation-linked bonds, in￿ation swaps, price discovery, ￿nancial
crisis
JEL-Classi￿cation: E43, F37, G15Non-technical summary
We analyze price discovery on traded in￿ation expectations in the euro area
and the US and how it changed during the ￿nancial crisis. In￿ation expecta-
tions are traded on the in￿ation-indexed bond market and the in￿ation swap
market. The quicker information is processed on one market and the less one
market is disrupted by the ￿nancial crisis the more valuable is its information
for central banks and market participants. We draw on the one hand on the
e￿ects of the di￿erent structure that is the size and liquidity of the two mar-
kets in both currency areas. On the other hand we look at the impact of the
￿nancial crisis that ampli￿ed severely in Autumn 2008.
We use a high frequency data set on in￿ation-indexed as well as nominal
government bonds and in￿ation swaps to calculate break-even in￿ation rates
(BEIR) that is in￿ation expectations plus risk and liquidity premia. Since swap
and bond BEIR draw on the same in￿ation-linked cash ￿ow arbitrage ties their
prices together. We therefore apply standard price discovery measures which
recover each markets contribution for driving an underlying e￿cient price of
the BEIR.
The euro area index-linked bond market is rather partitioned, with di￿er-
ent credit ratings of issuers and two relevant in￿ation indices, thus liquidity
is dispersed. Against this backdrop, the euro in￿ation swap market developed
very well recently. On the other side of the Atlantic, the US maintains a well
established issuance program of Treasury In￿ation Protected Securities (TIPS)
and exhibit only a small in￿ation swap market. Therefore, we expect the swap
market to lead price discovery in the euro area and the bond market to lead
in the US. However, these priors do not stand fully up to empirical evidence.
News a￿ecting the price of BEIR permanently are nearly evenly processed on
both markets for maturities up to 5 years in the euro area. Yet, for longer
maturities bond markets increasingly lead the price discovery process. These
results are somewhat dependent on the structure of the respective markets.
It is for the US where the in￿ation-indexed government bond market is large
in absolute volume and compared to overall Treasury issuance that the bond
market clearly dominates the price discovery process over all time horizons.
Only for the shortest time horizon one third of price innovations comes from
the swap market. Especially with longer maturities central government bonds
are the benchmark for hedging in￿ation risk and for pricing in￿ation expec-
tations in both currency areas. The wish to minimize counterparty risk even
in the presence of posted collateral and the desire for more transparency in
unregulated over-the-counter markets might prevent banks, brokers and cor-
porate treasurers to take in￿ation risk in their books that is priced di￿erently
to the government bond market.
During Autumn 2008 the turmoil in the ￿nancial systems worldwide ampli-
￿ed and pricing on ￿nancial markets became seriously disturbed. The dramatic
decrease of the part of price discovery that took place on the swap market il-
lustrates the severe dysfunction of the normally smooth working derivativemarket especially in the short to medium term. Increasing bid-/ ask spreads
- more pronounced with derivatives - , a re-pricing of risk, and the ￿nancing
constraints of typical arbitrageurs such as banks and hedge funds hampered
arbitrage between the bond and the swap market. BEIR were therefore more
driven apart than during our baseline scenario in Summer 2008. In the US,
disruptions coming from the short-end of the market even led to a collapse of
the integration of the two markets. Whereas a heightened risk aversion gen-
erally obstructed trades on ￿nancial markets, contributions to price formation
concentrated a lot more on the safest ￿nancial instrument: government bonds.
Thus, even though in times of severe ￿nancial stress swap curves might dis-
play a much smoother picture bond BEIR must not be omitted from economic
analysis.Nicht-technische Zusammenfassung
In diesem Papier untersuchen wir den Preis￿ndungsprozess f￿r handel-
bare In￿ationserwartungen auf den Finanzm￿rkten im Euro-Raum und den
USA. Diese Frage ist unter anderem wichtig f￿r Notenbanken, die sich ein
m￿glichst zutre￿endes Bild ￿ber die In￿ationserwartungen an den Finanzm￿rk-
ten machen wollen. Bei unserer Untersuchung interessiert uns einerseits, in-
wieweit unterschiedliche institutionelle Gegebenheiten in den USA und in Eu-
ropa einen Ein￿uss sich auf den Preis￿ndungsprozess hatten, insbesondere ob
die Preis￿ndung eher ￿ber den In￿ationsswapmarkt oder eher ￿ber die Anlei-
hem￿rkte erfolgte. Zum anderen wird analysiert, wie sich die Versch￿rfung der
Finanzmarktkrise im Herbst 2008 auf diesen Preisbildungsprozess ausgewirkt
hat.
F￿r die Analyse verwenden wir einen neuen Hochfrequenzdatensatz mit
Beobachtungen von nominalen und in￿ationsindexierten Staatsanleihen sowie
In￿ationsswaps und berechnen daraus Break-Even In￿ationsraten (BEIR),
ein Ma￿ f￿r In￿ationserwartung plus Risiko- und Liquidit￿tspr￿mien. Die
Zahlungsstr￿me von Indexanleihen und In￿ationsswaps beziehen sich auf den
gleichen Preisindex, daher sorgt eine Arbitragebeziehung f￿r gleichlaufende
Preise von Anleihen- und Swap-BEIR. Wir verwenden Preis￿ndungsma￿e aus
der Literatur, welche den Beitrag des jeweiligen Marktes zur Entwicklung eines
impliziten gemeinsamen Preises f￿r die BEIR bestimmen.
Der europ￿ische Markt f￿r in￿ationsgesch￿tzte Anleihen ist segmentiert:
Die unterschiedliche Kreditqualit￿t der Emittenten und zwei verschiedene In-
￿ationsindizes verringern die Liquidit￿t des Marktes. Vor diesem Hintergrund
entwickelte sich ein liquider einheitlicher Euro-In￿ationsswapmarkt. Auf der
anderen Seite des Atlantiks unterhalten die USA das gr￿￿te Emissionspro-
gramm f￿r in￿ationsindexierte Anleihen. Hingegen ist der US In￿ationsswap-
markt vergleichsweise klein. Daher kann man vermuten, dass im Euro-Raum
die Preis￿ndung eher am Swapmarkt statt￿ndet, in den USA jedoch st￿rker
am Bondmarkt. Unsere empirische Untersuchung ergibt allerdings ein etwas
anderes Bild. Im Euro-Raum werden die Informationen, welche den Preis der
BEIR dauerhaft beein￿ussen, f￿r Laufzeiten bis 5 Jahre nahezu gleich schnell
auf dem Anleihen- als auch auf dem Swapmarkt verarbeitet. Bei l￿ngeren
Laufzeiten dominiert allerdings zunehmend der Anleihemarkt. In den USA
erfolgt die Preis￿ndung tats￿chlich ￿ber praktisch alle Laufzeiten hinweg ￿ber-
wiegend auf dem Anleihemarkt. Nur f￿r kurze Laufzeiten tr￿gt der Swapmarkt
rund ein Drittel zur Preis￿ndung bei. In beidem W￿hrungen stehen somit -
vor allem f￿r l￿ngere Laufzeiten - Staatsanleihen sowohl f￿r die Absicherung
von In￿ationsrisiken als auch f￿r die Preisbildung von BEIR im Vordergrund.
Der Versuch ein - trotz Stellung von Sicherheiten - vorhandenes Kontrahenten-
risiko zu minimieren und die geringere Transparenz von ausschlie￿lich au￿er-
b￿rslichen gehandelten Swapgesch￿ften d￿rfte Banker, Wertpapierh￿ndler und
Finanzverantwortliche von Unternehmen kritisch gegen￿ber Preisabweichun-
gen vom Staatsanleihemarkt stimmen.Im Herbst 2008 versch￿rfte sich die Krise an den internationalen Fi-
nanzm￿rkten drastisch und die Finanzm￿rkte b￿￿ten zeitweise ihre Funktions-
f￿higkeit fast v￿llig ein. Die erhebliche Abnahme des Preis￿ndungsbeitrags
des Swapmarktes, vor allem f￿r kurze und mittlere Laufzeiten, ist ein Beispiel
f￿r die massiven Einschr￿nkungen von in normalen Zeiten reibungslos arbei-
tenden Derivatem￿rkten. Ausgeweitete Geld-Brief-Spannen - deutlicher bei
Swaps -, eine Neubewertung von Risiko und die Finanzierungschwierigkeiten
von typischen Arbitrageuren wie Banken und Hedgefonds haben zudem die
Ausnutzung von Preisunterschieden zwischen dem Anleihe- und dem Swap-
markt behindert. Dadurch entfernten sich die jeweiligen BEIR im Herbst
st￿rker voneinander als im ruhigeren Sommer 2008. In den USA f￿hrten
Schocks am kurzen Ende des Marktes sogar zu einer Disintegration beider
M￿rkte. In einem Umfeld generell hoher Risikoaversion konzentrierte sich die
Preis￿ndung auf das sicherste Finanzprodukt: Staatsanleihen. Daher sollten
aus Anleihen abgeleitete ￿In￿ationsstrukturkurven￿ - auch wenn aus Swaps
abgeleitete Kurven ein glatteren Verlauf aufweisen - nicht aus der Analyse von
In￿ationserwartungen ausgeschlossen werden.Contents
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Does the ￿nancial crisis matter?1
1 Introduction
For a central bank to ful￿ll its price stability mandate assessing in￿ation ex-
pectations is of crucial importance. Market participants gauging long-term in-
vestments have similar concerns about in￿ation. To hedge unexpected changes
in in￿ation rates in the distant future they can either take the in￿ation receiver
position of an in￿ation swap or go long a nominal government bond and short
an in￿ation-linked government bond of the same maturity. Instruments on
both markets are actively traded and provide us with break-even in￿ation rates
(BEIR), that is in￿ation expectations plus risk and liquidity premia. Which
market processes information about in￿ation more quickly and with more im-
pact on long run equilibrium prices? Is it the size of the respective market
that drives the lead in processing in￿ation information via BEIR? Has the
￿nancial crisis changed the price discovery process and bent it more towards
one instrument? These are the key questions of the paper.
There exists a huge body of literature on how to extract in￿ation expecta-
tions out of ￿nancial market data. However, to the extent of our knowledge
price discovery for BEIR has not been analyzed previously on an intra-day
basis. This paper ￿lls the gap.
Information shares of BEIR are large for central government bonds espe-
cially with longer maturities. The larger size of the in￿ation-indexed bond
market in the US compared to the euro area bend the price discovery pro-
cess even more to the bond market. Whereas in times of ￿nancial crisis a
heightened risk aversion generally obstructed trades on ￿nancial markets, con-
tributions to price formation concentrated a lot more on the presumably safest
￿nancial instrument: government bonds.
We make use of the approximate arbitrage relationship that exists between
bond BEIR and swap BEIR. Figure 1 shows that these instruments do indeed
react on news concerning actual and future in￿ation rates and serves as a ￿rst
illustration of the close relationship between them. Whereas in practice in￿a-
tion swaps and nominal and real government bonds are di￿erent instruments
and therefore di￿er in prices, the in￿ation linked cash ￿ows coming from the
￿rst and a long/ short combination of the second set of instruments are the
same. By means of arbitrage this restricts large price deviations between both
1Authors: Alexander Schulz, Deutsche Bundesbank, email: alexander.schulz
@bundesbank.de and Jelena Stapf, Deutsche Bundesbank, email: jelena.stapf
@bundesbank.de. We thank Christoph Fischer, Joachim Grammig, Joseph Haubrich,
Thomas Laubach, Franziska Peter, Stefan Reitz as well as seminar participants at the
Annual Congress of the EEA in Barcelona 2009, the International Conference on Macro-
economic Analysis and International Finance in Crete 2009 and Deutsche Bundesbank for
helpful comments. All remaining errors are ours. The opinions expressed in this paper do
not necessarily re￿ect the opinions of the Deutsche Bundesbank or its sta￿.
1instruments. The classical price discovery measures as developed by Hasbrouck
(1995) and Gonzalo and Granger (1995) have been applied to the same instru-
ment, eg a share trading in di￿erent local markets. We follow the approach
used by Blanco, Brennan, and Marsh (2005) and explore price discovery of





























































































































































































































































Figure 1: Yield of in￿ation-indexed bond with maturity 2012 and 4 year in￿a-
tion swap rate on 5 June 2008. President Trichet’s remarks in the ECB press
conference starting 2:30 p.m. were widely regarded as the turn in the euro
interest rate cycle.
We measure the contribution of each markets price innovation to a common
e￿cient price. We use a high frequency data set of the respective bonds and
swaps at one-minute intervals. Our sample periods range from May to Decem-
ber 2008. The considered period contains both rising and declining in￿ation
expectations, a turning point of monetary policy and the spread of a severe
￿nancial crisis.
The euro area index-linked bond market is rather partitioned, with di￿erent
credit ratings of issuers and two relevant in￿ation indices. Thus liquidity is
dispersed. Against this backdrop, the euro in￿ation swap market developed
very well recently (Hurd and Relleen (2006), Deacon, Derry, and Mirfendereski
(2004)). On the other side of the Atlantic, the US maintains a well established
issuance program of Treasury In￿ation Protected Securities (TIPS) and exhibit
only a small in￿ation swap market. Therefore, we expect the swap market to
lead price discovery in the euro area and the bond market in the US. However,
these priors do not stand fully up to empirical evidence. In the euro area for
shorter maturities up to 5 years new information comes from both markets,
whereas for horizons of 7 years and above the bond market increasingly leads
the price discovery process. In the US the bond market dominates the price
discovery process for all maturities. Only for the shortest time horizon one
third of price innovations comes from the swap market. Especially with longer
maturities central government bonds are the benchmark for hedging in￿ation
risk and for pricing in￿ation expectations in both currency areas.
The severe ￿nancial crisis that spread out in Autumn 2008 drove a wedge
2between bond BEIR and swap BEIR in both currencies. Price discovery ceased
to take place on the swap market. Disruptions coming from the short-end of
the market even separated price formation on both segments for maturities of
up to 6 years in the US. Thus even though the swap curve exhibits at times a
smoother pattern than its bond derived equivalent it is not adequate to shun
bonds from in￿ation expectation analysis.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: The next Section gives
an introduction of the respective markets where in￿ation expectations trade. It
also shows how arbitrage guarantees price proximity. Section three contains a
description of our data set. In Section four we explain the econometric method
used and Section ￿ve shows the results of our analysis of price discovery for
euro area and US data. The last Section concludes.
2 Two markets for trading in￿ation expectations
In￿ation has become a standard commodity on ￿nancial markets, or put dif-
ferently, a well accepted index to link ￿nancial claims to. In the following
we brie￿y describe the two most relevant markets for in￿ation-indexed claims:
bonds and swaps.
2.1 The in￿ation-indexed bond market
The UK pioneered the use of in￿ation-protected bonds. In￿ation-linked gilts
(gilt-edged securities) were ￿rst sold in 1981. 2 But only the start of the US
TIPS program in 1997 led the way for several other countries. Today, the US
market is the largest for in￿ation-protected bonds. It has an amount outstand-
ing worth US-$ 516 billion, which is more than 9% of overall Treasury notes,
bonds and bills issuance.3 TIPS are linked to the US city average all items
consumer price index for all urban consumers (CPI-U). Within the euro area
France, Greece, Italy and Germany have indexed bonds outstanding. France
is by far the most active issuer here, sponsoring two programmes linked to the
national CPI (ex tobacco, ￿rst issue in 1998) and the euro area harmonized
index of consumer prices (HICP, again ex tobacco - HICPxT, ￿rst issue in
2001), respectively. The combined amount outstanding is e137 billion. Ger-
many issued linkers in 2006 and has built up a volume outstanding of e22
billion. While German and French bonds enjoy a AAA rating status, Italian
government paper (e81 billion outstanding, start in 2003) and Greek govern-
ment bonds (e15 billion outstanding, 2003) are lower rated. They trade at a
spread to German and French bonds.
2See Campbell and Shiller (1996) for an overview of early linkers, including issues from
emerging markets.
3As of January 2009. Relative to its outstanding marketable debt the UK is still the
largest issuer, with a share of of 28%.
3Real interest rate 
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Figure 2: The BEIR derived from nominal and real bonds contains in￿ation
expectations as well as the in￿ation risk premium and the di￿erence of the
respective bonds liquidity premia.
We infer in￿ation compensation by subtracting real yields derived from
in￿ation-linked bonds from nominal bond yields using the Fisher equation. 4
Yet, bond yields not only incorporate in￿ation and real yields or growth expec-
tations. Investors require in addition compensation for unexpected future in-
￿ation rate changes in nominal bonds and for illiquidity, default risk and other
risk in nominal and in￿ation-protected bonds. Hence, the BEIR comprises
everything that is not uniformly priced or not compensated on both, nominal
and in￿ation-linked bond markets (see Figure 2). To begin with, the BEIR
contains in￿ation expectations among ￿nancial market participants. Secondly,
an in￿ation risk premium re￿ects compensation the nominal bond holders re-
quire for unexpected in￿ation rate changes whereas the in￿ation-indexed bond
holder is not exposed to that risk. Liquidity might be di￿erent on both mar-
kets. Nominal bond markets are larger in volume and might therefore be more
liquid. To get exposure to a BEIR one can either go long a nominal bond
and short an in￿ation-linked bond or vice versa. The cost of carry for both
bonds is di￿erent and has therefore implications for the level of the BEIR.
Repo specialness, delivery options for futures and other institutional features
might drive bond yields on both markets further apart. 5 Since we use pairwise
government bonds from the same issuer, default risk is not an issue here.
2.2 The in￿ation swap market
Markets for in￿ation-linked derivatives have grown quickly in recent years.
Their development has been complementary to those of in￿ation-indexed
bonds. The most important segment of the in￿ation derivatives market are
in￿ation swaps. These are traded in the over the counter market (OTC) by
￿nancial institutions, fund managers and corporate treasurers. The in￿ation
4See Section four for a more formal representation.
5A repo or repurchase transaction is a standard technique to fund purchases of ￿nancial
instruments, which serve as collateral themselves. See Buraschi and Menini (2002) for a
discussion of specialness.
4swap is a bilateral contract which requires one party to the contract (the in-
￿ation receiver) to make predetermined ￿xed-rate payments in exchange for
￿oating-rate payments linked to in￿ation from a second party (the in￿ation
payer). The basic building block of in￿ation swap structures is the zero coupon
in￿ation swap, where payments are exchanged only on maturity. Typical ma-
turities range from one year to over 30 years.
Euro zero coupon swaps are in general linked to the same index as most
bonds in the associated market. They pay the initially published non season-
ally adjusted euro zone HICPxT, possible later revisions have no e￿ect. The
in￿ation index is subject to a lag of three month. This ensures, that both
swap parties know the reference price level at the start of the contract. Unlike
in￿ation-linked bonds the reference price level for each day is not interpolated
between two neighboring months but changes at the end of the month. This
involves jumps at the day of the change of the month especially for shorter
maturities but has the advantage that a swap can be traded and unwound in
the same month without incurring future in￿ation risk (an interpolated swap
would retain some in￿ation risk). US zero coupon swaps are linked to the non
seasonal adjusted CPI-U and have an interpolated reference price level for each
day as base as well as an indexation lag of three month. This closely aligns
the swap market with the bond market in the US.
Although a modest amount of in￿ation-linked trades have taken place in
continental Europe since the early 1990s euro in￿ation swap volumes boomed
not before the early years of the new millennium. The issuance of bonds linked
to the euro zone HICPxT from the French and Italian government in 2001 and
2003 respectively supported the proliferation of the euro swap market. In 2007
the monthly notional amount traded was estimated at a two digit number of
billion euro. Euro in￿ation swaps were regarded as one of the fastest growing
OTC derivative contracts. In contrast to the euro area, the in￿ation swap
market in the US developed while the in￿ation-linked bond market had already
been in existence for some years. In 2004 when TIPS issuance picked up US-
CPI swaps became more popular as well. Yet, an estimated trading volume of
US-$ 11 billion in 2007 is only minor compared to that of the in￿ation-indexed
bond market (Peat and Segregeti 2008).
In￿ation swaps explicitly target the change of the price level. Thus the
swap BEIR is simply the quoted ￿xed rate agents are willing to pay in order
to receive the cumulative rate of realized in￿ation during the life of a zero
coupon swap. The swap BEIR depends on expected in￿ation over the life of
the swap as well as on various risk premia. Again, these premia comprise
compensation for unexpected in￿ation rate changes and liquidity. 6
In￿ation swaps are - compared to bonds - a new instrument, which hints to
an illiquid market. However, market reports indicate that the trading volume
of swaps clearly exceeds those of indexed bonds, which is of course partly
6Liu, Longsta￿, and Mandell (2006) deal comprehensively with liquidity and default risk
in interest rate swaps; to the extend of our knowledge, no similar study exists for in￿ation
swaps.
5due to the fact, that entering a swap does not involve funding costs. That
notwithstanding, market intelligence states a lack of in￿ation payers resulting
in in￿ation paid via swaps having a higher price than via bonds (Armann,
Benaben, and Lambert (2005) and ECB (2006b)).
The swap BEIR may involve in addition a premium for counterparty risk.
Payments are typically exchanged between two private corporations, mostly
banks and broker ￿rms but also hedge funds, insurers and non-￿nancial cor-
porations. Therefore the degree of creditworthiness attached to that payments
is typically lower than that of bonds issued by governments. Since the market
trade mostly zero coupon swaps with payments only exchanged on maturity the
counterparty risk especially for long term swaps could be prohibitively high.
Collateralization tackles that problem and has become increasingly popular
among OTC derivatives during the last years. The international swaps and
derivatives association (ISDA) states that 66% of ￿xed income OTC deriva-
tives were collateralized in 2008 compared to 48% in 2003 (ISDA 2005 and
2008). However, a special kind of counterparty risk remains even for fully
collateralized swaps: the default-to-replacement risk. It has come to the atten-
tion of a broader audience with the collapse of the investment bank Lehman
Brothers in September 2008 and contains two related risks. Firstly, collateral
is valued at the margin. This means that in case of default the creditor who
seeks a replacement has only a marginal price impact. Yet, when Lehman col-
lapsed a huge number of swaps needed to be replaced at the same time. This
obviously had more than a marginal impact. A shift in risk aversion might
put additional stress on prices. Furthermore, especially in a one-sided market
it will take some time to close open positions. This exposes the creditor to
general market risk (eg a monetary policy shock that could move in￿ation ex-
pectations) on top of the direct e￿ect of the default. Again, this risk occurring
after the default is not covered by collateral.
2.3 Pricing and arbitrage
There exists a huge body of literature on how to extract in￿ation expectations
out of ￿nancial market data. The literature is largely driven by sta￿ members
of investment banks and central banks. Whereas the former are more con-
cerned with pricing and valuation of in￿ation-indexed bonds and derivatives
for trading reasons (Peat and Segregeti (2008) and Kerkhof (2005)) the latter
focus more on pure long-term in￿ation expectations as indicator of credibil-
ity of their monetary policy (ECB (2006a), Hurd and Relleen (2006), Wright
(2008) and Kim and Wright (2005)). Over the last ￿fteen years especially
the search for measures of in￿ation risk premia, liquidity and other risk which
cloud in￿ation expectations proliferated. However, the price discovery process
on traded in￿ation expectations has been ignored so far.
Following Blanco, Brennan, and Marsh (2005) and Doetz (2007) we assume
that if di￿erent instruments spanning the same economic concept or payments,















Figure 3: Stylized trading strategy linking in￿ation-indexed bonds and in￿a-
tion swaps. Dealer buys in￿ation-indexed bonds, funds the purchase with a
repo and sells in￿ation protection into the swap market. The nominal swaps
closes the position.
of these instruments together. Otherwise the same claim, credit protection
in their case and in￿ation protection in our case, can be bought cheaper on
one market than on the other. Taking into account that we compare prices of
related but not identical instruments we are geared to the literature in speaking
of an approximate arbitrage relationship. Yet, we also take into account the
￿nding that derivative markets have shifted trading away from spot markets -
mostly due to lower funding costs - and are increasingly recognized to take the
lead in price formation, especially in ￿nancial crisis (Upper and Werner 2007).
In practice, an asset swap is the instrument that links bond and swap prices.
An asset swap exchanges a ￿xed investment, such as a bond with coupon pay-
ments, for a ￿oating investment, such as Euribor plus a spread. While nominal
asset swaps have been established for some time, real or in￿ation-linked asset
swaps have become popular only during the last ￿ve years. Like in a standard
asset swap the proceeds of a bond are exchanged against a ￿oating rate interest
payment, only that the proceeds are not ￿xed but in￿ation-linked. Thus, a
dealer might buy an indexed bond via a repo, provide an in￿ation-indexed cash
7￿ow to the market via an in￿ation swap and hedge its position with a standard
interest rate swap (Figure 3). 7 Fact is that ￿nancing constraints of dealers, ma-
turity mismatches stemming from the low number of available indexed bonds
and other transaction costs will hamper arbitrage. Di￿erences in market liq-
uidity both within the bond market and between bond and swap market as
well as variations in credit exposure impede price equality. Regulatory barri-
ers preventing investors to engage in derivative instruments or shorten bonds
a￿ect the balance of prices furthermore. Thus a constant spread between the
two break-even rates can - and does - prevail. However, markets prove to be
su￿ciently liquid to keep up the arbitrage relationship between bond and swap
BEIR in most cases.
3 Data
Our data-set consists of real and nominal bonds, as well as in￿ation swaps.
To avoid a credit bias, we concentrate on French and German bonds which all
have a AAA rating in the euro area. Furthermore, we focus on the HICPxT
as a reference for both in￿ation swaps and bonds, hence we remove bonds
linked to the French national CPI from our sample. 8 The US sample contains
TIPS with residual maturities from 2 to 10 years as well as Treasury Notes
and in￿ation swaps with equal maturities. We use two sample periods ranging
from May/June to August and from September to December 2008 which we
label Summer and Autumn 2008 respectively.
All bonds are capital indexed, ie their notional is in￿ated with the change of
the price index. Coupon and redemption payments are made on the adjusted
notional. There is some protection against severe and persistent de￿ation, as
redemption is never below the initial notional. In addition, we restrict the
euro area sample to bonds with maturities of up to twelve years, as these are
tenors for which in￿ation swaps are actively traded. 9 Altogether, we keep six
linkers in our sample covering maturities of 2, 4, 5, 7, 8 and 12 years. We
select six adequate nominal bonds to compute the BEIR (see Table A-1 in the
Appendix for a list of bonds used). The US operates the world’s most active
issuing programme; thus we are able to investigate the term structure of bond
BEIRs from 2 to 10 years for whole year tenors (see Tables A-2 and A-3 in
the Appendix).10 In￿ation swaps with corresponding tenors are forming the
7See Armann, Benaben, and Lambert (2005), p. 94, and Deacon, Derry, and Mirfend-
ereski (2004), chapter 9, for a lucid treatment.
8France as a vanguard on issuing in￿ation-linked debt in the euro area has set the standard
of linking claims on an index excluding tobacco products, thus controlling for adminstered
prices to some degree.
9As reported on Bloomberg. For longer horizons, eg the French bond expiring in 2040, we
would need to interpolate between infrequently traded 30 and 40 year in￿ation swap rates,
which is prone to errors.
10All bonds except for the 5 year tenors are o￿-the-run.
8alternative market.
We obtained bid and ask prices for bonds as well as for swaps, all on one
minute intervals. Furthermore we received the number of quote changes (ticks)
in each minute. This gives us an indication on the liquidity of the market. As
we do not have transaction data, we use the midpoint of bid and ask quotes as
the hypothetical transaction price. 11 For the euro area, we use quotes between
8 a.m. and 6 p.m. as trading hardly takes place in the interim time. The
Summer and Autumn data sets range from 5 May to 8 August 2008 and from
2 September to 8 December 2008 respectively. Each set spans 70 trading
days. Given the adjustments described above 439,000 swap midpoints remain
in our sample as well as about 315,000 observations of nominal bond prices
and 185,000 of indexed bonds (see Table A-4 in the Appendix). Claims on US
in￿ation are traded between 9 a.m. and midnight European Central Time. We
obtained data for the Summer sample from 12 June 2008 to 13 August 2008
and for the Autumn period from 3 September 2008 to 9 December 2008. This
makes a total of approximately 520,000 quotes for the nine nominal bonds,
324,000 for the in￿ation-indexed bonds and 858,000 quotes for the matching
in￿ation swaps (see Table A-5 in the Appendix). Prices are carried forward
until a new quote comes to pass. All data is taken from Bloomberg.
Bond prices are transformed into yields. We use the yield to maturity or
redemption yield concept to calculate bond yields from our price data. The
bond yields are therefore systematically slightly undervalued compared to the
zero coupon yields coming from our in￿ation swap data. 12 The prices for the
bond data re￿ect a decreasing time to maturity whereas the in￿ation swaps
are daily quoted whole year tenors. To establish comparability we adjust the
yields of the bond to whole year tenors as well. We use daily estimates of term
structures of nominal and real bonds to increase (decrease) the yields of our
bonds from the remaining time to maturity to whole year tenors.
Furthermore, we need to correct real bond yields for seasonality e￿ects.
These occur because bonds are linked to non-seasonally adjusted in￿ation in-
dices and yields can be biased especially for shorter maturities. 13 For example,
in the euro area consumer prices are typically low in January (high in April).
January (April) is indeed the reference month for in￿ation compensation of
German (French) bonds. Investors buying bonds at any other time during the
year adjust the price according to the higher (lower) actual non-seasonally ad-
justed in￿ation rates and therefore under- (over)estimate the bond yield and
the BEIR respectively. We corect for seasonality via daily seasonal factors
extrapolated from monthly seasonally adjusted and non-seasonally adjusted
11Intervals with only either a bid or an ask entry are eliminated.
12Calculating true zero coupon yields for our high frequency bond price data is nearly
impossible, as necessary interpolations are prone to contaminate the marginal price change
of a single bond.
13Only on coupon dates, there is no bias as in￿ation is paid out. For an explanation and
visualization of seasonality in CPI see for example Peat and Segregeti 2008, pp. 183.
9CPI data.14 The same adjustments are performed on US data. Yet, due to
the semiannual coupon payments of US bonds the issue of seasonality is less
virulent.
The respective competitive market comprises of six in￿ation swaps for the
euro area and nine for the US with tenors equivalent to the bond BEIR. Since
we consider only swaps with full year tenors we neither need to correct for
maturity nor seasonality.
4 Price discovery: Measurement method
If both the swap and the bond market price in￿ation expectation plus risk
premia equally, bond BEIR and swap BEIR of the same maturity should be
identical. Subject to the arbitrage imperfections noted above the di￿erence
between the two measures - here called the basis - should be nonzero. Nev-
ertheless a positive (negative) mean of the basis would imply that there are
irrevocable costs attached to the investment that makes the hedging of in￿ation
exposure more costly (more attractive) in one market.
The basis for a given tenor, t, is de￿ned as:















t are the yields of the nominal respectively real bond.
In the BEIR implicit in￿ation expectations are traded in the swap and
the bond market. Price discovery is the process by which prices embed new
information in either one or both of the two markets. Arbitrage implies that
prices cannot deviate too far. In econometric terms, prices are cointegrated
I(1) variables which means that the price series have one or more common
stochastic factors. If we assume that there is one cointegration relation only
and therefore one common factor, we can thus term this factor the implicit
e￿cient price. It is this price driven by new information which is the source
of the permanent movement in the prices of both markets. The price discov-
ery can be analyzed with two alternative concepts: Hasbrouck’s information
shares (Hasbrouck 1995) and Gonzalo and Granger’s contributions to the com-
mon factor (Gonzalo and Granger 1995). 15 Hasbrouck de￿nes price discovery
in terms of the variance of all innovations in a vector error correction model
(VECM) to the common factor. Gonzalo Granger involves only permanent
shocks where each markets contribution to the common factor is de￿ned to be
14See Eijsing, Garcia, and Werner (2007) for further explanations of the adjustment
method.
15See Hasbrouck (1995), Baillie, Bootha, Tse, and Zabotinac (2002), Mizrach and Neely
(2005) or Grammig and Peter (2008) for derivations and a discussion of both measures.
10a function of only the error correction coe￿cient in a VECM. Hasbrouck in-
formation shares use contemporaneous correlations between price innovations
in both markets as much as the variance of these innovations whereas Gonzalo
Granger does not. In the following we compute both measures.
If the two prices are I(1), cointegrated and have the rth order vector au-
toregression representation:
pt = 1pt 1 +  + rpt r + "t; (3)







evolve according to the Engle and Granger (1987) representation theorem in
a bivariate equilibrium correction process
pt = zt 1 + A1pt 1 +  + Arpt r 1 + "t; (5)
where zt 1 is the error correction term and "t is a zero-mean vector of serially
uncorrelated innovations. zt is a vector of di￿erences in prices between markets
and because swap BEIR are not directly comparable to bond BEIR includes
coe￿cient 2, that adjusts for daily changes in the basis and a constant c:
zt 1 = [p1;t 1   2p2;t 1   c]; (6)
zt 1 = 
0pt 1:
Following the Stock and Watson (1988) permanent-transitory decomposi-
tion Hasbrouck (1995) transforms equation (3) into a vector moving average






where 	(L) is a matrixpolynomial in the lag operator, L. 	(1) represents the
permanent e￿ect of the shockvector on all the cointegrated security prices, with
	(1)"t being the long run impact of an innovation in t. Under the assumption
of a single common factor the long run multipliers 	(1) can be provided in











11Since we assumed a single common factor  is a scalar and ? and ? are
the orthogonal complements of the original parameter vectors in (5) and (6).
Because the prices are cointegrated each error term must have the same long
run impact on prices. This means that all the rows in (8) are identical. If the
covariance matrix 
 of the residuals "t is diagonal, i.e. the contemporaneous












If there is correlation between the error terms, i.e.  6= 0, Hasbrouck (1995)
suggest a Choleski factorization of the covariance matrix such that 
 = MM0,
where M is a lower triangular matrix. 16 The Hasbrouck information shares for
market 1 and 2 are then de￿ned as:
H1 =
(1m11 + 2m12)2
(1m11 + 2m12)2 + (2m22)2; (10)
H2 =
(2m22)2
(1m11 + 2m12)2 + (2m22)2: (11)
That is market 1 information share is the proportion of the variance in the
common factor that is attributable to shocks in market 1. The factorization
imposes a greater information share on the ￿rst price (unless m12 = 0). There-
fore upper (lower) bounds of information shares are calculated when market 1
is ￿rst (second) in the ordering of the variables for the factorization. In the fol-
lowing we calculate midpoints of the upper and lower bounds of the Hasbrouck
shares induced by the di￿erent orderings of the variables.
An alternative measure for price discovery is based on the Gonzalo and
Granger (1995) decomposition of the price vector into a permanent, gt, and a
transitory, ft, component:
pt = 1gt + 2ft; (12)
where the permanent component is a linear combination of the prices in the two
di￿erent markets, gt =  pt, i.e.   is the common factor coe￿cient vector. The
additional identifying restriction that ft does not Granger-cause gt implies that
1 = ?0
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125 Price discovery in the Euro Area and the US
We ￿rst address the problem implied by the short time horizon of our data
set. In the remainder of the Section we lay out price discovery, ￿rst in the
comparatively calm period of the Summer and subsequently in the hot crisis
phase of Autumn 2008. Price discovery with forward rates is presented in the
last Subsection.
Since our data sets span each only 70 - for the US one only 45 - trading
days the use of cointegration techniques which target long run equilibria might
appear inappropriate. Yet, we are investigating an (near) arbitrage relation-
ship on a ￿nancial market, where corrections to deviations from equilibrium
could be e￿ected instantaneously or in our case every minute. Therefore we
expect the half live of deviations to be short-lived. Indeed, the average half
live of a deviation across all maturities and both markets is around 3 1=2 hours
in the euro area and 71=2 hours in the US in Summer 2008. If we set the length
of our data set in relation to this average half life as is proposed by Hakkio
and Rush (1991) we get a ratio of 190 or 94 respectively. Studies testing for
purchasing power parity where cointegration is routinely applied featuring half
lives of three to ￿ve years (Rogo￿ 1996). They would need over 300 years of
data to match a ratio of 100. However, the half live of deviations increases to
over 40 hours for euro area data and over 120 hours in the US in our extreme
crisis sample in Autumn 2008. This implies a ratio of the length of the data
set to the average half live of 16 or 6 respectively and gives a ￿rst hint that
trades and the adjustment to a common e￿cient price were distinctly slower
during the ￿nancial turmoil period.
5.1 Summer 2008: The baseline scenario
(a) Basis euro area (b) Basis US
Figure 4: Basis for tenor 7 years.
Data for the di￿erence between swaps and bonds, ie the basis, show that
this is signi￿cantly positive (see Figure 4 and Table 1). For all maturities -
except the shortest in the US - the basis is meaningfully greater than zero
13Table 1: Average of di￿erence between swap BEIR and bond BEIR
Euro Area
Summer 08 Autumn 08
Basis points
2 year swap-bond BEIR 37.9 45.2
4 year swap-bond BEIR 30.7 49.2
5 year swap-bond BEIR 36.7 68.5
7 year swap-bond BEIR 23.4 55.8
8 year swap-bond BEIR 24.2 61.5
12 year swap-bond BEIR 19.8 53.9
US
Summer 08 Autumn 08
Basis points
2 year swap-bond BEIR -3.1 125.9
3 year swap-bond BEIR 14.8 147.5
4 year swap-bond BEIR 25.0 115.6
5 year swap-bond BEIR 32.3 76.6
6 year swap-bond BEIR 64.9 147.0
7 year swap-bond BEIR 66.2 129.7
8 year swap-bond BEIR 53.2 105.4
9 year swap-bond BEIR 48.9 92.2
10 year swap-bond BEIR 45.5 94.9
implying that the BEIR derived from swaps lies unanimously over the bond
BEIR. One part of this di￿erence stems from our use of yields to maturity
for bonds versus zero coupon yields for swaps. If the yield curve does not
run completely ￿at, as is the case in our sample, yields to maturity are lower
compared to zero coupon yields. The di￿erence makes up to 8 basis points as
shows a zero coupon data set with daily frequency for both BEIR. Nevertheless
a signi￿cant and positive basis persists although it is on average smaller than
that of our high frequency data set. This is in line with previous literature
assessing the higher swap yield to liquidity considerations and other risk premia
(Armann, Benaben, and Lambert (2005), Campbell, Shiller, and Viceira (2009)
and Deacon, Derry, and Mirfendereski (2004)).
We performed unit root tests for all time series and could not reject the
null at conventional test sizes using the Augmented Dickey Fuller test. We
determined the lag order of the unrestricted vector auto regression following
the Schwarz information criterion. Since the criterion required at most 15 lags,
i.e. 15 minutes, we suspected that overnight returns did not play a prominent
role in our estimations. This in contrast would be the case if market prices
14jumped a lot between market close and opening on the next day. 17 Yet, swaps
and bonds are hardly traded outside the peak trading hours ranging from 8
a.m. to 6 p.m. in the euro area and from 9 a.m. to midnight in the US which
we fully cover in our sample.
We report Johansen trace statistics for the determination of the number
of cointegration vectors in Tables A-8 and A-9 in the Appendix. The pairs of
all swap and bond BEIR for all maturities exhibit one cointegration relation
and therefore one common trend. As has been discussed before, markets price
BEIR entirely equally only if the unity cointegration vector [1; 1] applies. Yet,
swap BEIR nearly always exhibit higher liquidity and risk premia than bond
BEIR. To cover this di￿erence, we included a constant in our cointegration
vector. In the euro area only shorter maturities, 2 and 4 years, comply with
the restriction of a common price up to a constant amount. For the US this
is the case for 2, 7, and 8 years. For other (longer) maturities at least one
market exhibit time-varying nontransient factors in its price that might be
due to nonstationary liquidity di￿erentials on both markets. 18
Table 2: Contributions to price discovery in the euro area
Hasbrouck inform. shares Gonzalo Granger
Summer 08 Autumn 08 Summer 08 Autumn 08
2 year swap BEIR 0.46 0.09 0.29 0.09
2 year bond BEIR 0.54 0.91 0.71 0.91
4 year swap BEIR 0.44 0.05 0.32 0.08
4 year bond BEIR 0.56 0.95 0.68 0.92
5 year swap BEIR 0.44 0.06 0.28 0.08
5 year bond BEIR 0.56 0.94 0.72 0.92
7 year swap BEIR 0.30 0.05 0.22 0.07
7 year bond BEIR 0.70 0.95 0.78 0.93
8 year swap BEIR 0.09 0.04 0.08 0.05
8 year bond BEIR 0.91 0.96 0.92 0.95
12 year swap BEIR 0.34 0.02 0.28 0.04
12 year bond BEIR 0.66 0.98 0.72 0.96
Note: Midpoints of Hasbrouck information shares are reported. Lower and upper
bounds can be found in Table A-10 in the Appendix. Where appropriate according
to the results in Table A-8 the restriction of an unity vector is imposed.
17Reestimation of the VECM and the Hasbrouck information shares with the overnight
returns substituted with the mean return of the following day showed virtually no in￿uence
on the parameters. We thank Franziska Peter and Joachim Grammig for performing the
estimation using their Gauss procedures.
18Since not all time series showed linear trends we did not include them in our cointegration
analysis. Nevertheless, once included the results did not change qualitatively.
15The Hasbrouck information share midpoints show that for tenors of 2 to
5 years price discovery on in￿ation expectations is nearly evenly split in the
euro area (see Table 2).19 Yet, the bond market leads as shares are still sig-
ni￿cantly di￿erent from equality. 20 This changes at longer maturities. Nearly
no price discovery takes place in the swap market for 8 year BEIR. This re-
sult is con￿rmed by the Gonzalo Granger contributions to the common factor
which are reported in the same table. 21 In contrast to what what we see in
price discovery studies featuring derivatives and their underlyings (Upper and
Werner 2007) it is not the derivative market that dominates price formation
in our study.
One interpretation of that result is that especially for longer maturities
protection against unexpected in￿ation rate deviations is virtually only pro-
vided by central governments. There is a supply and a demand side to that
argument. On the demand side, investors seek long term protection against
in￿ation and want to minimize counterparty risk. This cannot be completely
eliminated by posting collateral. The valuation underlying the exchange of col-
lateral is a marginal calculation. However, if a large market participant fails
all his counterparties need to hedge their positions. This results in more than
a marginal shift in demand or supply and, hence a price movement that is not
covered by the collateral posted. Note, that this argument does neither draw
on variations in risk-aversion nor on transaction costs. Nevertheless, trans-
action costs may be relevant as even in a highly developed system it takes
some time to negotiate new contracts. After the default of Lehman Brothers
some banks needed several weeks to ￿nd counterparties to hedge all their open
swap positions. Any price movement during this time is naturally not covered
by collateral. This remaining counterparty or default-to-replacement risk may
lead market participants to prefer risk free government bonds. On the supply
side it is reasonable to assume, that the banking sector’s aggregate supply of
in￿ation-indexed claims is zero. This is because banks typically only interme-
diate between di￿erent clients. Yet, in￿ation supply comes from the private
sector, too. Especially for the UK it is well documented that public private
partnerships are selling in￿ation into the market. 22 However, these privately
supplied cash ￿ows are very intransparent compared to indexed government
bonds. Hence ￿nancial institutions, brokers and corporate treasurers which
act as in￿ation takers on the swap market have a reason to be cagey when
taking in￿ation risk in their books that is priced di￿erently to the government
19See Table A-10 in the Appendix for upper and lower bounds of the Hasbrouck informa-
tion share measure.
20Wald tests on the equality of the ratio of adjustment coe￿cients or the ratio of the 
respectively are rejected at conventional test sizes.
21As discussed before, the divergence of both measures is greater when either the correla-
tion of the residuals or their variances di￿er signi￿cantly.
22This could be tra￿c infrastructure projects or hospitals. Many are regulated to adjust
their prices by the in￿ation rate or receive a share of their contract payments directly in￿ation
linked, typically the remuneration for operating expenses. See Grath and Windle (2006).
16bond market.
We motivated our use of an US data set with the di￿erent structure of mar-
kets for tradable in￿ation expectations in the euro area and the US. The prior
of a larger and more liquid in￿ation-linked bond market over a less established
in￿ation swap market can be recovered in the results for the US. Hasbrouck
information share midpoints and Gonzalo Granger contributions show a clear
lead of the bond market in our baseline scenario (see Table 3). Only for the
shortest maturity the swap market contributes less than one third to the price
discovery process. Most likely the volume of the respective market does play
a role in determining where price discovery takes place.
Table 3: Contributions to price discovery in the US
Hasbrouck inform. shares Gonzalo Granger
Summer 08 Autumn 08 Summer 08 Autumn 08
2 year swap BEIR 0.27 0.14
2 year bond BEIR 0.73 0.86
3 year swap BEIR 0.12 0.06
3 year bond BEIR 0.88 0.94
4 year swap BEIR 0.13 0.06
4 year bond BEIR 0.87 0.94
5 year swap BEIR 0.11 0.07 0.04 0.04
5 year bond BEIR 0.89 0.93 0.96 0.96
6 year swap BEIR 0.18 0.10
6 year bond BEIR 0.92 0.90
7 year swap BEIR 0.09 0.08 0.02 0.03
7 year bond BEIR 0.91 0.92 0.98 0.97
8 year swap BEIR 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.03
8 year bond BEIR 0.96 0.96 1.00 0.97
9 year swap BEIR 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.04
9 year bond BEIR 0.96 0.97 0.98 0.96
10 year swap BEIR 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.02
10 year bond BEIR 0.96 0.96 0.99 0.98
Note: Hasbrouck midpoints, lower and upper bounds can be found in Table A-11 in
the Appendix. Blank spaces indicate no cointegration relation. Where appropriate
according to the results in Table A-9 the restriction of an unity vector is imposed.
5.2 Price discovery in times of extreme ￿nancial crisis
In Autumn 2008 a fully-￿edged ￿nancial crisis propagated through the ￿nancial
system as well as the real economy. It left inter alia the US and the euro area
in a recession at the year-end. The turmoil on the ￿nancial markets went
17along with bigger amplitudes for price changes of ￿nancial instruments. The
increased variability showed up in both, the bond and the swap market (see
Tables A-6 and A-7 in the Appendix). Standard deviations for bond and swap
prices nearly quadrupled in the euro area and blew up tenfold in the US.
Furthermore, the price distribution exhibited a signi￿cant lower kurtosis, eg
prices were more splattered away from the mean. The higher variability was
more contained for longer maturities as short term markets were ￿rstly and
persistently disrupted during the ￿nancial crisis. The mean of BEIR decreased
considerably for all maturities and it even went negative for some tenors. Again
the development was more pronounced in the US. The mean of the BEIR
decreased far more in the US from partly over 3 percentage points to negative
values of partly over one percentage point for short to medium maturities.
The lower in￿ation expectations incorporated in the BEIR were in line with
an upcoming negative economic outlook and falling energy and commodity
prices which brought down actual in￿ation rates and in￿ation expectations
in surveys. Nevertheless it was partly driven by the liquidity drain stemming
from the withdrawal of risky assets and the search for highest-quality collateral
which a￿ected foremost nominal government bonds. The liquidity di￿erential
between nominal and real government bonds widened considerably and bond
BEIR fell accordingly.
The crisis involved a signi￿cant increase of risk aversion from the part of
investors and consequently a￿ected various ￿nancial instruments and markets
di￿erently. The di￿erence between swap and bond BEIR, the basis, increased
considerably since September 2008 (see Table 1). The wedge between the swap
and the bond market in the US broadened up to the point where one would
expect that both markets do not exhibit a near arbitrage relationship any
longer. At that stage, default-to-replacement risk had become manifest for all
market participants.
(a) Euro area (b) US
Figure 5: Bid-/ ask spread for 7 year in￿ation swaps.
Still, the question remains, why the elevated basis was not arbitraged away.
Three factors might have hampered the smoothing out of price di￿erences:
increased transaction costs, liquidity constrained dealers and interest rate un-
18certainty. Firstly, trades have become more costly due to increased bid-/ ask
spreads. The increase was pronounced with in￿ation swaps in particular (see
Figure 5). Even though the mean of the overall tight bid-/ ask spread was
higher by only half a basis point in our crisis sample, variation picked up dra-
matically. A bid-/ ask spread of 20 basis points which was not unusual in
November and December for some trading hours made relative value trades
prohibitively costly. Furthermore, spreads went up for bond trading as well.
On the bond market the spread increase was more pronounced for in￿ation-
linked compared to nominal bonds.23 While the absolute rise of the spread was
small in numbers it was twice as high on the in￿ation-indexed compared to
the nominal bond market. In accordance to that trading volumes of in￿ation-
linked bonds on electronic platforms decreased, in the case of the European
MTS system by over 60 per cent. For the TIPS market a more than doubled
spread as well as a reluctance to trade in￿ation-linked bonds were reported
(Madar, Rodrigues, and Steinberg 2009). This development ampli￿ed the liq-
uidity di￿erential between real and nominal bonds. Bond BEIR, the di￿erence
between nominal and real bonds, went down further. Secondly, some of the
most active traders, eg banks and hedge funds, faced liquidity and ￿nancing
constraints. With a diminishing capital basis caused by huge write-o￿s, banks
were forced to reduce both portfolio holdings and capital allocated to their
trading desks. Hedge funds, a standard class of arbitrageurs, faced signi￿-
cant withdrawals from their customers admit bad performance. Furthermore,
banks were less willing to ￿nance highly leveraged operations. Thus, banks,
hedge funds and other dealers could hardly invest in buying cheap bonds and
reselling the in￿ation-linked cash ￿ow in a likewise disturbed swap market.
Thirdly, increased interest rate uncertainty might also have hampered gap o￿-
setting trades. This is because it became more probable that rates would alter
signi￿cantly during the transaction time necessary to initiate, calculate, fund
and execute an arbitrage deal. Yet, it was not just demand that dried up con-
siderably. The supply side su￿ered comparably since fewer people were willing
to pay in￿ation or long-end rates.
Not surprisingly the disturbances a￿ected the pricing of di￿erent ￿nancial
market instruments di￿erently. 24 Price discovery changed signi￿cantly and
nearly ceased to take place on the swap market from September to December
2008 in the euro area (see Table 2). 25 In the shortest maturity segment just
under one tenth of information relevant for pricing was ￿rstly processed in
23Data from Bloomberg show that for one big trader spreads for linkers quadrupled
whereas the ones for nominal government bonds only doubled in Autumn compared to
the ￿rst half of the year.
24We performed unit root tests for all series. The number of lags recommended by the
Schwarz information criterion did not exceed 15 or 22 lags where a number of intermediate
lags were excluded. Johanson trace statistics for the number of cointegration vectors are
reported in Table A-8 in the Appendix.
25Wald tests on the equality of the information shares or the ratio of the  for the summer

























Figure 6: US In￿ation Swaps: number of daily quotes, tenor 2 years.
the swap market. For all other maturities pricing virtually only occurred on
the bond market. Likelihood ratio tests of the variables for the cointegration
vector showed weak exogeneity for bond BEIR with maturities above two years.
This adds to the interpretation that in the crisis period the swap market has
become nearly an appendix to the government bond market when it comes to
price in￿ation expectations.
What happened in the US in Autumn 2008 can be depicted as the collapse
of an integrated market for traded in￿ation expectations. Technically we were
not able to ￿nd a cointegration relation between the swap and the bond mar-
ket for maturities of 2, 3, 4, and 6 years (see Table A-9 in the Appendix).
Economically speaking, arbitrage did not prevent markets from developing in
completely di￿erent directions. The ￿rst explanation for this is the increase
in transaction costs due to liquidity and ￿nancial constraints. This led to
a downturn in trades and for the in￿ation swap market even the number of
quotes during a day decreased dramatically for shorter maturities (see Fig-
ure 6). Secondly, a feature that can be seen as unique for the US is that
the pronounced de￿ationary expectations hampered relative value trades in
BEIR. In￿ation-linked bonds safeguard investors against de￿ationary deduc-
tions which are above the coupon payments since the principle is always repaid
at least at 100 percent. This feature only becomes relevant in in the case of
extreme de￿ation since the embedded option is far out of the money in normal
times. However, in the extreme crisis period of Autumn 2008 it is not un-
reasonable to believe that investors actually assigned a positive value to this
option. Furthermore, the liquidity di￿erential between nominal and real US
bonds also widened substantially and therefore led to lower bond BEIR.
For maturities of 5 years, 7 years, and above we still found a cointegration
relation and the information shares showed a complete concentration of the
price discovery on the government bond market. Thus declining con￿dence
of investors hindered the trade of ￿nancial claims not only on the short term
money market segment but on longer-term markets as well. Solely the com-
20parable safest instrument, government bonds, seemed to be still accepted by
investors.
5.3 Price discovery with forward rates
The swap and the bond market are a￿ected by idiosyncratic liquidity and mar-
ket risk and market-speci￿c demand factors. Therefore it might be helpful to
look at cointegration and price discovery for BEIR forward rates derived from
BEIR spot rates. As long as the market speci￿c factor in￿uence all maturities
to the same extent they cancel out when computing forward rates. We calcu-
lated 5 year forwards starting in 2 years and starting in 5 or 7 years for both
markets and both periods. The series turned out to be stationary in the euro
area in the Summer sample, so no cointegration analysis was executed. For
the Autumn period we calculated Hasbrouck info shares and Gonzalo Granger
contributions to the common factor. For the 5 year forward starting in 2 years
both measures were slightly higher than those for the 5 year spot rate in the
euro area. Nevertheless the swap market accounted for less than one ￿fth of
price discovery. This is far lower than the info shares computed using the spot
rate in the Summer period. This corroborates our interpretation that the crisis
infected the short-term segment of the market di￿erently from long-end rates.
Furthermore it shows that apart from idiosyncratic factors prevailing on both
markets, the government bond market clearly dominates price discovery for
traded long-term in￿ation expectations.
Forward BEIR from US data showed that price discovery was even in the
baseline scenario quantitatively more concentrated on the bond market. For
the crisis sample we found a cointegration relationship among the 5 year for-
ward bond and swap BEIR starting in 2 and 5 years. 26 This might imply
that what broke the cointegration relation is contained in liquidity di￿eren-
tials across maturities of the same market.
6 Conclusions
We analyze the price discovery for BEIR by using a high frequency data set
on in￿ation-indexed as well as nominal government bonds and in￿ation swaps.
News a￿ecting in￿ation expectations incorporated in the BEIR are slightly
quicker processed on bond markets for maturities up to 5 years in the euro
area. For longer maturities bond markets increasingly lead the price discovery
process. These results are somewhat dependent on the structure, that is the
volume and liquidity of the respective markets. It is for the US where the
TIPS market is large in absolute volume and compared to overall Treasury
issuance that the bond market clearly determines the price formation over all
time horizons. This is consistent with the notion that even full collateralization
26As a caveat note that unit root tests with forward swap rates are rejected in the majority
of cases which is not surprisingly as forward rates are calculated as di￿erences of spot rates.
21does not completely eliminate counterparty risk. The default-to-replacement
risk remains: collateral is valued at the margin and does not cover the time to
re-enter positions after the default of a contract party.
During Autumn 2008 the turmoil in the ￿nancial systems worldwide am-
pli￿ed and pricing on ￿nancial markets became seriously disturbed. Price
discovery ceased to take place on the swap market. This illustrates the severe
dysfunction of the normally smooth working derivative market especially for
short to medium maturities. Increasing bid-/ ask spreads - more pronounced
with derivatives - hampered arbitrage between the bond and the swap market.
BEIR were therefore more driven apart than during our baseline sample in
Summer 2008. Disruptions coming from the short-end of the market even led
to a collapse of the integration of the two US markets. Whereas a heightened
risk aversion generally obstructed trades on ￿nancial markets, contributions
to price formation concentrated a lot more on the safest ￿nancial instrument:
government bonds. Thus, even though in times of severe ￿nancial stress swap
curves often displayed a much smoother picture bond BEIR must not be omit-
ted from economic analysis.
In general, BEIR are priced higher on the swap market. We assign this
mostly to liquidity and risk premia. Furthermore the di￿erence between instru-
ments on both markets is not constant but display time variation. We propose
the default-to-replacement risk as one features driving this time variability.
Embedded put options in in￿ation-linked bonds which safeguard against a loss
in an extreme de￿ationary setting are another explanation for time variable
swap and bond BEIR di￿erences. Since idiosyncratic liquidity and risk pre-
mia are di￿cult to quantify it might be a promising starting point for further
research to relate changes in the liquidity premia to aggregate liquidity condi-
tions following Adrian and Shin (2008).
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24Appendix
(a) Euro area (b) US
Figure A-1: Break-even in￿ation rate from bonds and swaps for tenor 7 years.
25Table A-1: List of euro area bonds
Tenor ISIN Coupon Type First Issue Maturity
2 years FR0108664055 1.25 real 20 Apr 2006 25 Jul 2010
FR0107674006 2.50 nominal 16 Jun 2005 12 Jul 2010
4 years FR0000188013 3.00 real 25 Jul 2001 25 Jul 2012
FR0000188328 5.00 nominal 25 Apr 2001 25 Apr 2012
5 years DE0001030518 2.25 real 24 Oct 2007 15 Apr 2013
DE0001135234 3.75 nominal 04 Jul 2003 04 Jul 2013
7 years FR0010135525 1.60 real 25 Jul 2004 25 Jul 2015
FR0010163543 3.50 nominal 25 Apr 2004 25 Apr 2015
8 years DE0001030500 1.50 real 08 Mar 2006 15 Apr 2016
DE0001135291 3.50 nominal 23 Nov 2005 04 Jan 2016
12 years FR0010050559 2.25 real 25 Jul 2003 25 Jul 2020
FR0010192997 3.75 nominal 04 May 2005 25 Apr 2021
Notes: Real bonds indexed to the harmonized euro area HICP ex tobacco.
Indexation month for French paper is April, for German January.
Table A-2: List of US nominal bonds
Tenor ISIN Coupon First Issue Maturity
2 years US912828CX62 3.375 10/15/2004 10/15/2009
3 years US912828FD71 4.875 5/1/2006 4/30/2011
4 years US912828GQ75 4.5 4/30/2007 4/30/2012
5 years US912828HY90 3.125 4/30/2008 4/30/2013
6 years US912828CT50 4.25 8/16/2004 8/15/2014
7 years US912828EE63 4.25 8/15/2005 8/15/2015
8 years US912828FQ84 4.875 8/15/2006 8/15/2016
9 years US912828HA15 4.75 8/15/2007 8/15/2017
10 years US912828HR40 3.5 2/15/2008 2/15/2018
Notes: US bonds pay interest semiannually.
26Table A-3: List of US in￿ation-indexed bonds (TIPS)
Tenor ISIN Coupon First Issue Maturity
2 years US912828CZ11 0.875 10/29/2004 4/15/2010
3 years US912828FB16 2.375 4/28/2006 4/15/2011
4 years US912828GN45 2.0 4/30/2007 4/15/2012
5 years US912828HW35 0.625 4/30/2008 4/15/2013
6 years US912828CP39 2.0 7/15/2004 7/15/2014
7 years US912828EA42 1.875 7/15/2005 7/15/2015
8 years US912828FL97 2.5 7/17/2006 7/15/2016
9 years US912828GX27 2.625 7/16/2007 7/15/2017
10 years US912828HN36 1.625 1/15/2008 1/15/2018
Notes: TIPS are indexed to the CPI-U and pay interest semiannually.
Table A-4: Number of observations by instrument: Euro area
tenor nominal bond real bond in￿ation swap
2 years 32,655 27,488 72,002
4 years 49,024 45,241 73,410
5 years 57,452 18,733 73,312
7 years 56,934 42,337 73,850
8 years 63,017 12,617 73,942
12 years 55,782 38,973 72,213
total 314,864 185,389 438,729
Notes: Number of bid-/ ask pairs. 5 May to 8 December 2008.
27Table A-5: Number of observations by instrument: US
tenor nominal bond real bond in￿ation swap
2 years 26,798 17,831 95,349
3 years 46,858 25,651 94,599
4 years 55,833 29,308 95,463
5 years 58,825 37,561 91,589
6 years 64,525 36,599 98,166
7 years 62,793 35,823 94,420
8 years 66,964 43,040 98,673
9 years 69,090 47,661 90,027
10 years 68,935 51,196 99,973
total 520,621 324,670 858,259
Notes: Number of bid-/ ask pairs. 12 June to 9 December 2008.
Table A-6: Descriptive statistics of break-even in￿ation rates in the euro area
Pre-crisis/ Summer 08 Crisis/ Autumn 08
Mean Std.dev. Kurtosis Mean Std.dev. Kurtosis
2 year bond BEIR 2.35 0.24 2.54 0.91 0.90 1.40
4 year bond BEIR 2,34 0.17 2.58 1.17 0.75 1.36
5 year bond BEIR 2.25 0.16 2.53 1.11 0.71 1.31
7 year bond BEIR 2.36 0.13 2.34 1.41 0.53 1.38
8 year bond BEIR 2.34 0.12 2.58 1.43 0.53 1.41
12 year bond BEIR 2.39 0.11 2.41 1.70 0.40 1.67
2 year swap BEIR 2.73 0.23 2.56 1.36 0.82 1.43
4 year swap BEIR 2.65 0.16 2.69 1.67 0.67 1.52
5 year swap BEIR 2.62 0.14 2.61 1.79 0.59 1.55
7 year swap BEIR 2.59 0.11 2.67 1.98 0.45 1.60
8 year swap BEIR 2.58 0.10 2.61 2.05 0.39 1.62
12 year swap BEIR 2.59 0.09 2.06 2.24 0.28 1.85
28Table A-7: Descriptive statistics of break-even in￿ation rates in the US
Pre-crisis/ Summer 08 Crisis/ Autumn 08
Mean Std.dev. Kurtosis Mean Std.dev. Kurtosis
2 year bond BEIR 3.07 0.26 1.74 -1.75 2.77 1.51
3 year bond BEIR 2.87 0.20 1.68 -1.22 2.11 1.48
4 year bond BEIR 2.75 0.20 1.68 -0.26 1.46 1.48
5 year bond BEIR 2.67 0.19 1.76 0.49 0.95 1.51
6 year bond BEIR 2.33 0.17 1.98 -0.05 1,23 1.56
7 year bond BEIR 2.30 0.15 2.56 0.26 1.08 1.60
8 year bond BEIR 2.40 0.14 2.55 0.62 0.97 1.66
9 year bond BEIR 2.43 0.11 2.54 0.90 0.75 1.80
10 year bond BEIR 2.47 0.12 3.00 1.01 0.60 1.97
2 year swap BEIR 3.04 0.33 1.96 -0.49 1.64 1.58
3 year swap BEIR 3.03 0.30 1.90 0.25 1.27 1.64
4 year swap BEIR 3.00 0.26 1.88 0.89 0.90 1.92
5 year swap BEIR 3.00 0.22 1.96 1.26 0.77 2.34
6 year swap BEIR 2.98 0.20 2.02 1.41 0.66 2.06
7 year swap BEIR 2.96 0.17 2.07 1.56 0.58 2.03
8 year swap BEIR 2.93 0.14 2.22 1.67 0.53 2.15
9 year swap BEIR 2.92 0.12 2.44 1.82 0.46 2.29
10 year swap BEIR 2.93 0.10 2.36 1.96 0.38 2.38
29Table A-8: Long-run relation between swap BEIR and bond BEIR in the euro
area
Pre-crisis/ Summer 08
# coint. vectors (cv) Restriction on cv
None At most 1 (1,-1,c)
2 year swap-bond BEIR 66.91*** 2.59 1.18
4 year swap-bond BEIR 111.07*** 3.05 2.85*
5 year swap-bond BEIR 97.61*** 2.66 22.43***
7 year swap-bond BEIR 166.85*** 3.41 67.49***
8 year swap-bond BEIR 187.65*** 3.31 66.10***
12 year swap-bond BEIR 61.64*** 5.23 16.65***
Crisis/ Autumn 08
# coint. vectors (cv) Restriction on cv
None At most 1 (1,-1,c)
2 year swap-bond BEIR 151.93*** 2.93 60.71***
4 year swap-bond BEIR 44.94*** 3.09 11.39***
5 year swap-bond BEIR 23.88*** 3.47 7.46***
7 year swap-bond BEIR 23.27*** 2.97 5.19**
8 year swap-bond BEIR 35.19*** 3.36 19.33***
12 year swap-bond BEIR 46.67*** 3.13 30.17***
Rejections of the null at the 10%, 5%, or 1% level is indicated by a superscript *,**, or *** respectively.
30Table A-9: Long-run relation between swap BEIR and bond BEIR in the US
Pre-crisis/ Summer 08
# coint. vectors (cv) Restriction on cv
None At most 1 (1,-1,c)
2 year swap-bond BEIR 34.23*** 0.73 1.98
3 year swap-bond BEIR 87.77*** 0.96 16.53***
4 year swap-bond BEIR 90.90*** 0.75 29.07***
5 year swap-bond BEIR 122.79*** 0.94 26.83***
6 year swap-bond BEIR 179.55*** 1.07 71.53***
7 year swap-bond BEIR 139.04*** 1.61 44.11***
8 year swap-bond BEIR 122.31*** 2.15 0.04
9 year swap-bond BEIR 128.65*** 1.56 0.48
10 year swap-bond BEIR 145.78*** 2.10 19.13***
Crisis/ Autumn 08
# coint. vectors (cv) Restriction on cv
None At most 1 (1,-1,c)
2 year swap-bond BEIR 119.73*** 12.05***
3 year swap-bond BEIR 181.45*** 31.88***
4 year swap-bond BEIR 54.65*** 9.21**
5 year swap-bond BEIR 25.30*** 7.34 4.40**
6 year swap-bond BEIR 52.28*** 10.76**
7 year swap-bond BEIR 61.18*** 6.94 44.68***
8 year swap-bond BEIR 56.14*** 7.71 40.39***
9 year swap-bond BEIR 41.20*** 7.28 22.89***
10 year swap-bond BEIR 41.89*** 2.70 24.92***
Rejections of the null at the 10%, 5%, or 1% level is indicated by a superscript *,**, or *** respectively.
31Table A-10: Bounds on Hasbrouck information shares in the euro area
Summer Autumn
Lower Upper Lower Upper
2 year swap BEIR 0.44 0.47 0.08 0.11
2 year bond BEIR 0.53 0.56 0.89 0.92
4 year swap BEIR 0.42 0.47 0.03 0.07
4 year bond BEIR 0.54 0.58 0.93 0.97
5 year swap BEIR 0.41 0.46 0.04 0.08
5 year bond BEIR 0.54 0.59 0.92 0.96
7 year swap BEIR 0.27 0.32 0.03 0.06
7 year bond BEIR 0.68 0.73 0.93 0.97
8 year swap BEIR 0.08 0.10 0.03 0.06
8 year bond BEIR 0.90 0.92 0.94 0.98
12 year swap BEIR 0.29 0.30 0.01 0.03
12 year bond BEIR 0.63 0.70 0.97 0.99
Note: Where appropriate according to the results in Table A-8 the restriction of an
unity vector is imposed.
32Table A-11: Bounds on Hasbrouck information shares in the US
Summer Autumn
Lower Upper Lower Upper
2 year swap BEIR 0.27 0.27
2 year bond BEIR 0.73 0.73
3 year swap BEIR 0.44 0.47 0.08 0.11
3 year bond BEIR 0.11 0.12
4 year swap BEIR 0.88 0.89
4 year bond BEIR 0.13 0.13
5 year swap BEIR 0.86 0.87 0.03 0.04
5 year bond BEIR 0.10 0.11 0.96 0.97
6 year swap BEIR 0.18 0.19
6 year bond BEIR 0.81 0.82
7 year swap BEIR 0.09 0.09 0.02 0.02
7 year bond BEIR 0.91 0.91 0.98 0.98
8 year swap BEIR 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.00
8 year bond BEIR 0.96 0.96 1.00 1.00
9 year swap BEIR 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.02
9 year bond BEIR 0.96 0.96 0.98 0.99
10 year swap BEIR 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.01
10 year bond BEIR 0.96 0.96 1.00 0.99
Note: Where appropriate according to the results in Table A-9 the restriction of an
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